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• In the EU ETS, free allowance allocation is used to safeguard 
the competitiveness of the regulated industries and to avoid 
carbon leakage. In Phase I and II, most allowances were given 
for free. With Phase III, auctioning became the default method 
for allocation of allowances. However, industrial sectors receive 
free allowances according to emission efficiency benchmarks 
and depending on the sectoral risk of carbon leakage. Sectors at 
risk of carbon leakage are identified based on carbon and trade 
intensity.
• We analysed the empirical research on the EU ETS relevant to 
free allocation. First, no strong evidence has been found that 
the EU ETS affected the competitiveness of the regulated indus-
tries. Second, an overly conservative criterion for identifying the 
sectors at risk of carbon leakage meant that free allowances were 
given to installations which most likely were in fact not at risk. 
Third, evidence of pass-through of carbon costs was found not 
only for the electricity sector, but also for industrial sectors. 
• The reform for Phase IV proposed by the European Commission 
introduces some changes relevant to free allocation. Notably, it 
devises a more efficient criterion for identifying the sectors at 
risk of carbon leakage and it sets a rule for updating the bench-
mark values.
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1.  Introduction
Since 2005, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU 
ETS) has been the main instrument adopted by the 
EU to decarbonise its economy, and the largest cap-
and-trade scheme globally. It regulates the emissions 
of carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and per uorocar-
bons from more than 11,000 heavy energy-using 
and power generating installations and airlines, cov-
ering about 45% of the EU’s greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions.
As the EU ETS poses a carbon cost, there are con-
cerns that it may a ect the international competi-
tiveness of the  rms operating in some of the regu-
lated sectors, with the risk that production is moved 
to countries without similar climate policies.  is 
would most likely result in carbon leakage, that is, 
a rise in emissions in countries where regulation is 
less stringent. Free allocation of emission allowances 
(herea er, “free allocation”) is the approach used in 
the EU ETS to mitigate the risk of carbon leakage. 
In the context of the current reform of the EU ETS, 
the rules on free allocation have been reconsidered 
and are currently being discussed by the EU legisla-
tors and stakeholders. Under the LIFE SIDE project, 
the Florence School of Regulation-Climate (FSR-
Climate) contributed to this debate by organising a 
workshop dedicated to the subject.1
A er recalling some fundamental notions about free 
allocation, this policy brief summarises the evolu-
tion of free allocation in the EU ETS, the relevant 
empirical evidence, and the signi cant elements of 
the current reform.  e brief draws on the assess-
ment of the EU ETS that the FSR-Climate is carrying 
out as part of the LIFE SIDE project and the conclu-
sions of the above-mentioned workshop.
1.  The programme and contents of the workshop are available here: 
http://lifesideproject.eu/event/allocation-of-free-allowances-in-eu-ets-
to-address-the-risk-of-carbon-leakage/?instance_id=1.
2.  e basics of free allocation
In a cap-and-trade scheme such as the EU ETS, the 
emission allowances can be distributed through free 
allocation or auctions. Auctioning has some impor-
tant advantages: it is e  cient (in the allocative sense) 
and generates revenue. However, it poses an extra 
cost for the installation operators. As a consequence, 
some  rms may see the deterioration of their inter-
national competitiveness with the risk of shi ing 
production outside the EU. In the long run, this may 
even result in the diversion of investment to other 
regions with less stringent regulation.  e shi  in 
production to overseas would lead to carbon leakage. 
To prevent this outcome, the emission allowances 
can be granted for free to the  rms operating in the 
sectors deemed to be at risk.
 e free allowances can be allocated before or a er 
the emissions are generated. With ex-ante allocation 
(o en called “grandfathering”), the amount of allow-
ances allocated to an installation is determined based 
on historical emissions or output. With ex-post allo-
cation (o en called “output-based allocation”), the 
amount of allowances is proportional to the emis-
sions generated or to the corresponding output. 
With ex-ante allocation,  rms have an incentive to 
reduce their output emission intensity, as the more 
e  cient they become the more unused allowances 
they will hold. However, the unused allowances are 
retained by the  rm also if emissions decline not due 
to improved e  ciency, but because of reduced output 
(due, for example, to a negative demand shock or to 
deteriorating competitiveness).
3. Free allocation in the EU ETS
In Phase I (2005-2007) and Phase II (2008-2012) of 
the EU ETS, it was the responsibility of the Member 
States (MS) to set the national total of emission allow-
ances and to distribute them.  e allowances were 
mostly given for free based on past emissions, with 
only a few MS auctioning small quotas.  ough the 
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National Allocation Plans had to be consistent with 
the criteria indicated in the ETS Directive (2003/87/
EC), the heterogeneity in the allocation approaches 
adopted by di erent MS could have potentially dis-
torted competition in the internal market (Ellerman 
et al., 2010).
In 2009, a major reform of the EU ETS was agreed for 
Phase III (2013-2020). Since 2013, the total number 
of allowances – the “cap” – has been determined at 
EU level and a single set of rules governs their allo-
cation.  e EU ETS cap declines annually by 1.74% 
and auctioning is indicated as the default allocation 
method.  e allowances for the installations that are 
power stations are in principle allocated through 
auctions (with exceptions for 8 lower-income MS). 
For the industrial installations, di erent rules of free 
allocation apply depending on whether the sector 
the installation belongs to is one deemed at risk of 
carbon leakage. As a rule, the installations in the sec-
tors at risk of carbon leakage are allocated free allow-
ances up to 100% of their e  cient level of emissions 
(hence, allowances for emissions exceeding this level 
must be bought).  e e  cient level of emissions 
is determined by multiplying the relevant output 
emission intensity benchmark2 by the installation’s 
previous output level (chosen between the median 
annual output over 2005-2008 and that over 2009-
2010). For all other installations, free allowances 
cover emissions up to 80% of the e  cient level in 
2013 and progressively smaller proportions in subse-
quent years, reaching 30% in 2020. Moreover, a uni-
form Cross-Sectoral Correction Factor (CSCF) may 
be applied to installations to ensure that the total 
number of allocated free allowances does not exceed 
the annual limit.3  e CSCF is being applied in Phase 
III. In 2013 it reduced the total number of free allow-
ances by 5.7%. As a result of the annual reduction 
of the total available allowances, the CSCF has been 
decreasing yearly and it is estimated that by 2020 the 
2.  As a rule, the benchmark is the average output emissions intensity of 
the 10% most emissions efﬁ cient installations over 2007- 2008. The 
European Commission deﬁ ned 54 benchmarks.
3.  If the CSCF is triggered, free allowances may not cover 100% of the 
emissions of the most emissions efﬁ cient installations.
total amount of free allowances will be reduced by 
17.6%.4 Finally, an ex-post allocation adjustment is 
applied in the following cases: if annual output falls 
below 50%, 25% or 10% of the historical level, the 
amount of already allocated allowances is reduced 
by 50%, 75% and 100%, respectively.
 e identi cation of the sectors at risk of carbon 
leakage is based on two indicators: Carbon Intensity 
(CI) and Trade Intensity (TI). CI is measured by the 
ratio of A) the sum of direct and indirect emissions 
(i.e., through electricity consumption) valued at €30/
tCO2, to B) gross value added. TI is measured by the 
ratio of A) the sum of exports and imports respec-
tively to and from third countries, to B) the sum of 
turnover and imports from third countries. A sector 
is classi ed as being at risk of carbon leakage if it falls 
in at least one of these categories: “High CI” (>30%), 
“High TI” (>30%), or “both su  ciently high CI and 
TI” (CI >5% and TI >10%).  e sectors for which CI 
or TI cannot be quanti ed have been assessed based 
on qualitative analysis.  e  rst carbon leakage list 
was de ned in 2009, for the years 2013 and 2014. 
Out of 258 sectors, 165 were classi ed to be at risk 
of carbon leakage.  ese sectors made up 95% of 
industry emissions in the EU ETS (de Bruyn, 2013). 
More than 70% of the sectors deemed at risk of 
carbon leakage fall in the “High TI” category and 
not in the others.  e second carbon leakage list was 
adopted in 2014 for the years 2015-2019.
4.  e empirical evidence
Within the EU ETS literature, more than 80 studies 
(including peer reviewed papers, working papers, 
book chapters and reports) were found providing 
empirical evidence relevant to free allocation.  ese 
studies can be classi ed according to three thematic 
areas.  e  rst area concerns the e ects of the EU 
4.  These values were determined by the EC in 2013. As a result of the 
judgment of the European Court of Justice of 28 April 2016, in January 
2017, the Commission recalculated the CSCF factors. The new values 
are higher than the previous ones but they are applied only to decisions 
on free allocations that are adopted after 1 March 2017. Hence, for the 
majority of industrial installations, the values adopted will remain the 
initial ones.
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ETS on competitiveness and carbon leakage.  e 
second concerns the e  ciency of the rules of free 
allocation.  e third concerns the costs pass-through 
of emission allowances to consumers.5
4.1 E ects on competitiveness and carbon leakage
Our literature review identi ed 32 econometric 
studies searching for the e ects of the EU ETS on 
competitiveness.  ough the studies looking at 
stock value e ects stand out as a more homogenous 
subset, the literature identi ed is diverse in sev-
eral respects. First, di erent dependent variables 
related to competitiveness are considered, including 
net exports, number of employees, turnover, value 
added, pro ts, total factor productivity, and stock 
value, among others. Second, di erent data are used, 
which are most o en  rm-level data or, in some 
cases, sector-level data.  ird, di erent e ects are 
tested, as most studies search for sector-speci c and/
or country-speci c e ects, while the others search 
for more general average e ects. Fourth, di erent 
methods are used, di erence-in-di erences and 
standard panel data analyses being the most popular. 
Fi h, di erent time periods are analysed, with most 
studies covering Phase I or both Phase I and II, and 
few stretching as far as Phase III.
By far the most frequent conclusion is that no evi-
dence is found of negative, statistically signi cant 
e ects of the EU ETS on economic performance. A 
few studies  nd some negative e ects, which however 
are generally modest and fragmentary across sec-
tors, countries, and time.  e non-occurrence so far 
of signi cant negative e ects is principally explained 
by: a) the generous supply of free allowances, b) low 
allowance prices, and c) the partial pass-through 
of the cost of the allowances to consumers. What is 
more, the studies examining the correlation between 
the carbon price and company stock values consist-
ently  nd positive relationships in Phase I and o en 
also in Phase II.  e results for Phase III are instead 
5.  The list of the works considered will be available in a report which 
will be produced by the LIFE SIDE project (lifesideproject.eu).
mixed. Finally, the only econometric study directly 
searching for carbon leakage (Dechezlepretre et al., 
2014)  nds no evidence of emissions shi ing from 
the EU ETS to overseas.
4.2 E  ciency of free allocation
Nine studies were found assessing the e  ciency of 
free allocation in Phase III (described above).  is 
particular literature comprises two subsets: the 
studies (3) concerned with the de nition of the sec-
tors at risk of carbon leakage and those (6) focusing 
on the allocation method.  e  rst subset shows that 
the risk of carbon leakage can vary widely across 
countries, depending on di erences in produc-
tion, technology, fuel mix and process emissions, 
amongst others. Moreover, there is evidence that the 
method for identifying the sectors at risk of carbon 
leakage was probably too conservative, in the sense 
that many sectors considered to be at risk were in 
fact not as exposed. Using alternative assumptions 
(notably, a €12/tCO2 carbon price instead of €30/
tCO2), de Bruyn et al. (2013) calculate that only 33% 
of all sectors should be deemed at risk of carbon 
leakage. Consistent with this  nding, Martin et al. 
(2015), who use results from a survey, showed that 
the risk of  rm relocation under the EU ETS is corre-
lated with carbon intensity, not with trade intensity. 
Yet, most of the sectors at risk of carbon leakage are 
deemed as such only because of high trade intensity.
 e second set of works looked at the allocation 
method. It was found that the total number of free 
allowances in the industrial sector was reduced by 
about 20% compared to Phase II, quite uniformly 
across sectors.  ere was also a redistribution of 
allowances within the sectors, rewarding the more 
e  cient installations thanks to the benchmarking 
system. However, some critical issues were high-
lighted. It was found that the EU procedure to esti-
mate the benchmark is best suited to homogeneous 
sectors, such as cement, where the production process 
is similar across countries, but less for other sectors, 
such as pulp and paper, which are very heterogeneous 
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with many di erent products and production pro-
cesses. Moreover, some studies showed, at least for the 
cement sector, that the ex-post adjustment based on 
the production thresholds (which was present also in 
Phase I and II) may have created incentives to main-
tain higher production levels.
4.3 Cost pass-through of emission allowances
Several works deal with  rms’ ability to pass through 
the cost of the allowances to consumers.  is is rel-
evant to free allocation in that if a  rm can pass its 
carbon cost, it should be able to pay for the allow-
ances it needs without hampering its competitive-
ness. Pass-through rates are estimated by quanti-
fying the extent to which changes in output prices 
are explained by underlying changes in CO2 prices. 
Time-series econometric analysis is the most used 
methodology. Most of these works analyse the elec-
tricity sector, mainly with reference to Phase I and 
Phase II, while only few contributions cover some 
industrial sectors.  is is partly explained by data 
availability: the power sector has a relatively simple 
input structure (with primary energy sources as the 
main input) and abundant information is generally 
available.
For the power sector, most of the literature reviewed 
 nds a relatively high pass-through rate, although 
with signi cant variation across countries and over 
time, partly due to di erent data and methods used. 
High pass-through in the power sector is related to 
low elasticity of demand and to lack of exposure to 
international competition. By passing through the 
value of the allowances that they received for free, 
power companies could increase their pro ts – so-
called windfall pro ts.  is was seen as an unjusti-
 ed transfer from taxpayers to companies and, as 
a result, most emission allowances have been auc-
tioned to the power sector since 2013.
For the industrial sectors, the cost pass-through rate 
widely varies across sectors, products and countries. 
High rates were found for some sectors, notably iron, 
steel and re nery. For the chemicals sector, the cost 
pass-through rate varies among products with many 
of them showing high rates.  e same is true for the 
ceramics sector. With regard to the cement sector, 
the cost pass-through rate varies signi cantly from 
one country to another: it is very high in Portugal 
or Poland, but low in the UK. By contrast, other sec-
tors, such as the paper sector, present low or null 
pass through. Using the minimum pass-through 
rate found in the literature, it was estimated that the 
windfall pro ts of the 15 most polluting industrial 
sectors, in 19 EU countries, amounted to 15 billion 
euro over the period 2008-2014 (de Bruyn et al., 
2016).
5. Phase IV reform
In July 2015, the EC proposed a revision of the 
EU ETS for Phase IV (2021-2030).  e proposal is 
consistent with the EU target of 40% reduction of 
overall GHG emissions by 2030 (with respect to the 
1990 levels) and with the international commitment 
under the Paris Agreement.  e proposal needs to 
be approved by the EU Parliament and by a majority 
of MS in the EU Council.
With regard to free allocation, while the proposed 
reform does not fundamentally change the working 
of the system, it introduces some noteworthy modi-
 cations.
•  e EC has proposed to maintain the share of 
allowances to be auctioned at 57%, as at the end 
of Phase III.  e lower-income MS can continue 
to give allowances to electricity facilities for the 
modernisation of the energy sector.  e installa-
tions in the sectors at risk of carbon leakage would 
continue to receive free allowances covering 100% 
of their e  cient level of emissions according to 
the benchmark. For the other sectors, free allow-
ances would cover 30% of the e  cient emissions 
level, without further reductions. 
• A sector would be deemed at risk of carbon 
leakage only if the product of its trade and carbon 
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intensities exceeds 0.2.  is is a more stringent 
criterion which, according to the EC, should 
reduce the number of sectors deemed at risk from 
177 to around 50.
•  e benchmarks would be updated at the begin-
ning and in the middle of the Phase to take into 
account the technological progress made since 
2008.  e benchmark values would be reduced by 
a standard rate of 1% for each year since 2008. If 
the data shows a di erence in the annual emission 
intensity reduction greater than 1.5% or smaller 
than 0.5%, the reduction rate applied is 1.5% or 
0.5%, respectively.
• To reach the EU target of 40% GHG emis-
sions reduction by 2030, the EC has proposed 
to decrease the EU ETS cap by 2.2% annually 
(instead of 1.7%).
 e reform is currently under discussion among the 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission.  e 
 nal approval of the reform is expected in the next 
months. Considering the current debate at the insti-
tutional level, the key elements of the EC proposal 
are likely to be retained in the  nal version of the 
reform.
6. Discussion and conclusion
 e purpose of free allowance allocation is to safe-
guard the competitiveness of the regulated indus-
tries and, thus, to avoid carbon leakage. With Phase 
III, the EU ETS has moved from granting almost 
all emission allowances for free towards a system 
where auctioning is the default allocation method. 
Free allowances are still granted to the manufac-
turing industry, with higher shares allocated to the 
sectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage based on 
carbon and trade intensities. Overall, the current 
allocation system is transparent, relatively simple 
and uniform across the EU. However, the criteria 
for identifying the sectors at risk of carbon leakage 
were shown to be overly conservative.  e empirical 
research showed that many sectors considered at 
risk of carbon leakage did not actually face such risk. 
Moreover, there is little empirical evidence of the EU 
ETS having had a negative impact on the regulated 
industries so far.
 e reform for Phase IV proposed by the EC o ers 
some improvements on the current regulation of free 
allocation. Notably, it devises a better calibrated and, 
therefore, more e  cient criterion for identifying the 
sectors at risk of carbon leakage.  is is important 
both to reduce the risk of unjusti ed windfall pro ts 
and to improve the e  ciency of the system. Indeed, 
given the annual reduction of the cap and the associ-
ated declining amount of free allowances, the more 
sectors are de ned at risk, the fewer allowances will 
be available for each sector. Moreover, the proposed 
modi cation aims to take into account the techno-
logical progress of the regulated sectors by updating 
the benchmark values. 
As the cap declines over time, fewer allowances 
will be available. It is therefore crucial that both the 
industry and public institutions invest in the devel-
opment of low carbon technologies, especially in 
those sectors having limited potential for emissions 
abatement with existing technologies. In this con-
text, it is recommendable that the MS use signi cant 
shares of their auction revenues to foster such invest-
ments. Finally, to safeguard the EU industry and, 
ultimately, to mitigate climate change, it is important 
to continue working towards an international agree-
ment on carbon pricing, which may come with the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement.
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